The US Policy Around the Unfolding Arab Spring

This is a summary of a talk given by Professor William Quandt, on the 8th December 2011 at the London School of Economics.  It gives some great insight into what went through the minds of US policy makers as well as the reasoning behind some of their choices.

Introduction

• If the Arab Spring had happened during the Bush reign, no doubt they would have welcomed it and even taken credit for it… at least until it started showing its Islamist dimensions.
• Obama from early on (2002) when he was a state senator in Illinois had gone out on a limb and opposed the Iraq war.
• Obama during his campaign for presidency talked about engaging with Iran and Syria and putting the Israeli and Palestinian Peace Process on top of the agenda.
• Democracy promotion was not put on the agenda by Obama as much as you would expect from someone trying to put America in a light which is diametrically opposed to its current excesses.
• The election of Netenyahu as president of Israel was bad news for Obama’s hope of reviving the Peace Process.
• When Iran went to the polls, Americans naively hoped things would change, and if it had, it would have been easier for Obama to engage with Iran but the elections were controversial and once Ahmedinejad was back in power the prospect of any early Iran relations was put on the backburner.

Tunisia and the Beginning of the Arab Spring

• All this was overshadowed by the revolution in Tunisia in Dec 2010
• Ben Ali is gone and shortly things move to Egypt with Mubarak being ousted and then ofcourse Muammar Gaddafi in Libya
• Other uprisings are harder to predict : Syria, Bahrain (put down by considerable force) and many smaller uprisings and calls for reform in places like Morocco, Jordan and Algeria
• American foreign policy makers are not very swift at understanding great radical change in the region… they are used to stability and weren’t prepared to take proper action on these events.
• Obama needed a more cohesive and skilled team around the president in order to deal with these new circumstances.
• Public discussion on almost all matters of public policy amounts more or less to partisan bickering and intense competition.  The coming elections are obviously related to this atmosphere.
• How has the Obama administration coped with the Arab Spring challenge? Not Very Well…
• The Wikileak cables showed that as early as 2009 and 2010, the US ambassador in Tunisia said that Tunisia should no longer be considered an ally to the US.  There was widespread corruption and a lot of opposition to Ben Ali’s dictatorship – the cables became public in December 2010 just before Bouazizi’s self-immolation.
• So American policy makers were surprised at the way events unfolded but no shocked by them.
• More interesting to me is that Rached Ghannouchi made the obligatory tour of thinktanks and media outlets in America as well as the pro-Israeli Washington institute for Middle-East Policy to prove his moderation. He also praised the Obama Administration for the good policy toward Tunisia and Political Islam.
• I agree with the judgment that America now sees that Tunisia is on its way to a very promising, democratic outcome.
• This wasn’t a difficult test for the US, the stakes were not high, there weren’t very large strategic interests there and no large vested interest in the Ben Ali regime. So America came out on the right side of that one.

Egypt

• Egypt is a tougher case for the US and Obama and his team was not that sure-footed.
• Mubarak had been a solid US ally, he co-operated on Gulf security, Kept the peace with Israel (very important for Americans) and provided a lot of support to the US on the War on Terror.
• The relationship between Pentagon and Egyptian Military was particularly strong.
• Bush 43 pushed for reform to democracy but the minute the Muslim Brotherhood showed strength in the 2005 elections, the US backed away from “democractic reform”
• Obama went to Cairo in 2009 and gave a major speech. Contained criticism of Mubarak regime, but Mubarak wasn’t there nor mentioned in the speech. But there was no indication of a drastic change in the relationship of the US with Egypt.
• But the US was still aware of some sort of change in the air. Mubarak was aging, rumours of his son succeeding him was rife and the rumoured “upre Mubarak”  (said in French – Uprising against Mubarak) – I’ve been going to Cairo every year for the last 20 years and these rumours were always there. What was surprising was how this change had come on January 25^th in Tahrir Square.
• But after Tunisia, this wasn’t surprising.  The two movements had a lot of similarities.
• Because the revolution was peaceful and focused on a clear national demand – “Yarhal Mubarak” meant that Americans could watch this and feel good about it. It was a good revolution.
• And for the first time you found Americans Glued to AlJazeera English, even those that didn’t have it demanded it and the cable providers obliged.
• Americans were then all talking about getting a “soft transition” – meaning we wanted power to fall into the hands of people we knew… like Omar Sulaiman. Who Mubarak just named as Vice president.
• And as well the army should not shoot at protestors so that they can play a role in the “soft transition” – as I said we had a great relationship with the Egyptian Military.
• During the 18 days of the revolution and the succeeding months, the US was largely reactive lagging behind the constantly changing reality on the ground with the key channel of communication being between the Pentagon and SCAF
• On the diplomatic side the Sec. of State and the White House believed that “Mubarakism” without Mubarak was the preferred option… Omar Sulaiman was also the preferred candidate by Israel.
• The thought by the US that the protestors on the ground might accept this option shows how out of touch they really were with Egyptian Public opinion.
• By early February, Sec. Clinton sent Frank Wisner to Egypt to deliver a message to Mubarak and to the Army. He was to tell Mubarak to step down and say his son will not succeed him and to tell the SCAF not to harm the protestors… Since he was there without any further instructions, an idea was discussed in the US that in order to bring about the reforms to guarantee democracy, Mubarak would need to stay his full term so that elections could be held according to the “law”.
• I thought this was a bit crazy… to be in the midst of a revolution and be terribly punctilious about a constitution that was about to be suspended. None the less, this idea caught on and Wisner got caught up in it.  Hilary Clinton then picked this up and said it publicly in Europe.
• This again showed how out of touch the US was with popular sentiment.
• The crowds in Tahrir asked to depose both Mubarak and Omar Sulaiman. Obama then came out in support of the people in Tahrir and the Us Admin then said this to SCAF.
• The New Egypt – the “Facebook-iyeen” – would it be different or resemble the old Egypt with the military still in charge and the Muslim Brotherhood playing an outside role.  But even so, with the Muslim Brotherhood, there are some issues would stand against the US especially regarding Israel and the Palestinians.
• Even though “democracy promotion” seems like a great ideal for the US, for those in power in the new Egypt, especially those not getting the benefit of the US funds ( SCAF and Muslim Brotherhood), Democracy Promotion simply means more foreign interference and was rebuffed.
• The new American Ambassador was declared persona non-grata for offering funds to Egyptian pro-democracy groups without the permission of those in power.

 

Libya

• Before the US could digest Egypt… they had to confront other revolutions in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. They realized each would have to be dealt with very differently, there is no one size fits all.
• Gadaffi had diplomatic relations with the US. Condoleeza Rice had even visited him and he had an odd fascination with her.
• Obama had decided to depart with the way Bush43 had dealt with Iraq and “lead from behind” by making a “no fly zone” and leaving the rest to NATO – France and UK and providing Drones and Spies.
• Libyan rebels who would not have won on their own were able to overcome large armies.
• After the event , some thinkers in the US said we should have stayed out given that the new government might be Islamist.  Overall there was little concern over what might come next.

Syria

• More complex and strategic was the issue of Syria – the US was dealing with the Assads (Father and Son) for 4 decades.
• Obama admin found it impossible to maintain a policy of engagement with the regime in Syria, and no appetite for military intervention… the Libyan model didn’t seem relevant for the facts on the ground in Syria.
• Hilary Clinton has met with the Syrian opposition, giving rhetorical support but no formal recognition.
• Syria’s crisis comes as US troops makes final departure from Iraq… and few, if any, had asked for those troops to move to Syria for deployment.  It seems the US has few ideas and little influence when it comes to Syria.
• Yemen: Most Americans would have a hard time finding it on a map or understanding anything about its culture and history.
• So after the resistance against Ali Abdullah Saleh showed began and showed resilience in the spring of 2011  it got less attention in the US Media. Even after Tawakkul Karman won the Nobel Peace Prize for her role in the protests, it still remained a mystery for most Americans.
• Some pentagon planners wanted to have drone attacks against this latest remnant of the terrorist franchise.
• US did lend support to the Saudi and GCC effort to persuade Saleh to give up power, but for most in the US, Yemen was confusing and distant and best left alone to GCC and others without getting too involved.

 

Bahrain

• Bahrain: here the values and interest of the US came into a direct clash and Interests won out. Even neocon enthusiasts were worried that Iran were involved in the largely Shia uprisings and once Saudi Arabia decided to act; the US was not about to second guess its moves.
• Only late in 2011, once the Basyouni report came out with clear condemnation of the leadership did the US come out with calls for reform.

Current US approach to the Region

• Obama and team cautious and pragmatic.. .balancing values and interests and wanting very much to avoid another Iraq.
• Their caution makes them seem to be lagging behind, reactive rather than strategic.
• Few in the administration have any real insight into the region. – Just listen to any republican debate (there are surprisingly many nowadays) or watch Fox news, if you have the stomach for it.
• New shift to a less interventionist style of foreign policy, it costs less than dreams of imperion and Costs matters in the US economic climate. It provides spare capacity to deal with contingencies and accepts the reality that the US is not very good at asserting itself as a global Hegemon, or trying to nation build or trying to export democracy.
• But it would be a mistake to read US isolationism into this. We’re too involved and engaged with the world and too big to be passive observers.
• While US influence is limited, it’s not negligible.

His Proposals for US Foreign Policy

• What I would like to see, if Obama is re-elected, is a serious re-thinking of the foreign Policy along the following lines…
  • Bring in new Advisors who know something about the region
  • Get serious about supporting the new democracies in smart ways – Education, Economic Aid, Investment, Technology. We can make a difference with this and we’re pretty good at it.
  • Work closely with Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, Morroco and others who seem to be interested in real reform and democracy.
  • Don’t give up on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace issue, even though its pretty dismal currently and certainly don’t give Israel a blank cheque on issues concerning Iran or on building of settlements in the Occupied territories
  • If there is a new leadership in Syria, we should look at an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement, all the ingredients are there and have been for some time, this would not be difficult
  • Cool off on the hysterical discussion about Iran, lean on Israeli’s not to pre-empt. Look for alternatives on the Iranian side. Patience is not much of a policy but the alternatives regarding Iran are all worse.
  • We should understand that the Arab Spring will continue over many years and many different configurations and we should try and help where possible but we can’t control the process.
  • The great thing about the Arab spring was that it was made in the Arab world and not imported from anywhere… firmly indigenous.
  • We should remain largely on the sidelines as they work through their issues.
  • One of the great things to see is the pride in the ordinary Arab people as they stand up for themselves.  They will let us know when and how and whether we can be helpful as they try to undo the legacy of decades of stagnation.